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The Political Economy of the British
National Health Service, 1945–1975:
Opportunities and Constraints?
JOHN STEWART*
The National Health Service (NHS) has often been regarded, by both academic com-
mentators and the public, as the centrepiece of Britain’s welfare state. It has retained a
high degree of popularity, and politicians have had to take account of this, privately
and publicly. So, for example, in the late 1950s a leading Conservative observed that
the electorate might accept cuts in defence spending: “But meddle with National Health?
That’s political suicide.”
1 A quarter of a century later Margaret Thatcher felt obliged to
declare at the Conservative Party annual conference that “the National Health Service is
safe with us”.
2 The Labour Party has been particularly keen to associate itself with the
NHS, playing on its central role in the service’s creation. At the 2001 general election,
for instance, the manifesto of the Scottish Labour Party proclaimed that: “For over 50 years,
the NHS has been part and parcel of what it means to be British. Its foundations—tax-based
funding and care according to need—remain as valid today as ever.”
3 In doing so, it
stressed the service’s founding principles alongside the assertion that it is a central com-
ponent of British identity.
The purpose of this essay is to set the scene for the other pieces in this collection by
looking first at the opportunities afforded by the creation of the National Health Service;
and, second and in rather more detail, at the constraints upon it. This is not to decry the
service’s undoubted achievements. Rather, it is to argue that as a result of factors both
intended and unintended brakes have been put on the development of the kind of unified
health service, dedicated to preventive and social medicine, that reformers have
envisaged since the beginning of the twentieth century. The achievements of the NHS
notwithstanding, there is a large measure of truth in the observations of some early critics
who argued that what was created was not a national health service at all. Instead, it was
a national hospital or a national sickness service—that is one which focused largely
on hospital and curative medicine, and did little actively to promote health.
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453In consequence, overlapping or related areas such as public health, preventive medicine,
and social medicine were relatively neglected.
5
This essay also incorporates a brief case study of the Medical Research Council
(MRC). The aim here is twofold: to show, using a particular example, how opportunities
and constraints operated in practice in an era of (purportedly) socialized medicine.
Second, to provide further background for the papers by Helen Valier and Carsten
Timmermann, and by Luc Berlivet. The former examines an important aspect of the
MRC’s work, clinical trials.
6 As we shall see, the Council sought to encourage medical
research across a wide spectrum—from “pure” science to social medicine. Such a broad
definition of medical research, and the range of solutions offered for the problems
diagnosed, reflected the range of scientific and policy options available in the post-war
era. Berlivet’s paper, meanwhile, deals with a body which in certain key respects was
the French equivalent of the MRC—the Institut National d’Hygie `ne (INH, which in
1964 became the Institut National de la Sante ´ et de la Recherche Me ´dicale, INSERM).
7
Both bodies had broad remits within the general field of promoting medical research.
Moreover, the very existence of INSERM owed much to the MRC model.
8 The res-
pective accounts of their functions and activities thus allows for the sort of com-
parisons encouraged and stimulated by this collection. As with other papers in this
volume, the period covered by this essay is from the end of the Second World War
to the early 1970s—the era of the “classic” welfare state. This in turn coincided
with what has been termed the “era of biomedicine”, in which the MRC played an
important part.
The MRC and its Definition of Medical Research
As Anne Hardy has remarked, the MRC has received relatively little attention from
historians.
9 But in principle at least it had an important strategic and commissioning
role in medical research and, by the early 1970s, was receiving around £25 million
5On social medicine, see, for example, Dorothy
Porter, ‘The decline of social medicine in Britain in
the 1960s’, in Dorothy Porter (ed.), Social medicine
and medical sociology in the twentieth century,
Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1997, pp. 97–119.
6Helen Valier and Carsten Timmermann,
‘Clinical trials and the reorganization of medical
research in post-Second World War Britain’, below.
7Luc Berlivet, ‘Between expertise and
biomedicine: public health research in France after
the Second World War’, below.
8See Viviane Quirke, Collaboration in the
pharmaceutical industry: changing relationships in
Britain and France, 1935–1965, New York and
Abingdon, Routledge, 2007, ch. 5 and 6.
9Anne Hardy, Health and medicine in Britain
since 1860, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 100. For
an “official” history of the MRC, see A
Landsborough Thomson, Half a century of medical
research. Volume 1: Origins and policy of the
Medical Research Council, and Half a century of
medical research. Volume 2: The programme of the
Medical Research Council, London, HMSO, 1973;
and, more briefly, A Landsborough Thomson, ‘Origin
and development of the Medical Research Council’,
Br. med. J., 1963, ii: 1290–92. For a collection of
essays on the MRC which deal for the most part with
the first half of the twentieth century, see Joan
Austoker and Linda Bryder (eds), Historical
perspectives on the role of the MRC, Oxford
University Press, 1989. An important aspect of the
Council’s role in the first half of the twentieth century
is discussed in Edward Higgs, ‘Medical statistics,
patronage and the state: the development of the MRC
Statistical Unit, 1911–1948’, Med. Hist., 2000, 44 (3):
323–40. For the influence of this Unit on INSERM,
see Berlivet, ‘Between expertise and biomedicine’,
below.
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454pounds from the government.
10 The MRC was founded in 1913 with a brief, as its
“official” historian—Sir Arthur Landsborough Thomson—put it, to “promote research
in the biomedical field”. From the outset it was, and remained, an independent body in
the sense that it was not attached to any particular government ministry. Rather, it was
under the control of, first, a committee of the Privy Council and then, from the mid-
1960s, the Department for Education and Science.
11 This autonomy was to ensure that
the Council be “a scientific body of independent standing” and that it likewise should
not be subject to “the pressures inseparable from attachment to a large administrative
department”—namely, the Ministry of Health. None the less, the Ministry, along with
other government departments and bodies with an interest in health issues, was repre-
sented on the Council. Equally, the overwhelming majority of its members were
appointed for their expertise in medical science.
12 This situation was confirmed by the
National Health Service Acts of the late 1940s. The actual mechanisms varied over
time, but essentially the MRC was directly funded by the central state.
13
In terms of the research it undertook or promoted, the MRC took a broad view.
Shortly after the creation of the NHS, James Stirling Ross remarked that the Council
had “power ...to promote a programme of research on the widest lines ...particularly
for long-range problems”.
14 Its official historian claimed that “the whole of medical
science has always been the Council’s field”. Although the particular emphasis changed
over time, none the less the MRC’s origins lay in preventive medicine. It had, for
instance, taken an interest in “industrial and social medicine” as a result of the problems
experienced by munitions workers during the First World War. The Public Health
Laboratory Service, which was under the control of the MRC until its own independence
in 1961, was an important instance of this approach.
15 The Council further involved
itself in social medicine and health inequalities by, for example, supporting the Social
Medicine Research Unit from its foundation in the late 1940s until its demise in 1975.
As Shaun Murphy has noted, the Unit was set up when enthusiasm for social medicine,
“generated by an upsurge in interest in social issues and a specific desire to promote
occupational health research”, was high.
16 Among the issues the Unit investigated
were, in the early 1950s, the incidence of coronary heart disease in certain occupations;
and, in the mid-1960s, juvenile delinquency in East London.
17 Mental health and its
social context, meanwhile, were dealt with by the Social Psychiatry Research Unit
10Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 874,
cols. 457–8, Written Answers, 10 June 1974.
11Landsborough Thomson, Half a century of
medical research. Volume 1, op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. v, 47, 61. The MRC was originally the Medical
Research Committee. Its name was changed at the
time of the creation of the Ministry of Health
immediately after the First World War.
12Landsborough Thomson, ‘Origin and
development’, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 1291–92.
13Landsborough Thomson, Half a century of
medical research. Volume 1, op. cit., note 9 above,
ch. 15.
14James Stirling Ross, The National Health
Service in Great Britain, Oxford University Press,
1952, p. 167.
15Landsborough Thomson, ‘Origin and
development’, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 1292.
16Shaun Murphy, ‘The early days of the MRC
Social Medicine Research Unit’, Soc. Hist. Med.,
1999, 12 (3), pp. 389–406, at p. 405.
17Report of the Medical Research Council for the
Year 1950–1951, Cmd. 85841, London, HMSO,
1952, p. 85; Report of the Medical Research Council,
October 1963–March 1965, Cmnd. 2787, London,
HMSO, 1965, p. 153.
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455which in the late 1950s was investigating, inter alia, admission patterns to London
mental hospitals.
18
Nor was clinical research neglected. The appointment of Professor Harold Himsworth
as Secretary of the MRC in 1949 gave a particular boost to the Council’s activities in this
field.
19 The Council itself noted in the early 1950s that “during the present century
progress in medical research has been more rapid than at any other time in history”.
Historically, though, clinical research had been slower to make advances but in recent
decades “progress in the clinical field has been gaining momentum”. This had come
about because of the increasing possibility of direct investigation on patients. Advan-
ces in clinical knowledge were thus “no longer dependent entirely upon the chance
observation of naturally occurring events”, so allowing for a truly “scientific”
approach.
20
But the MRC consciously and explicitly embraced a very broad definition of “clinical
research”. Dealing with this subject in the context of the formation of the NHS, a 1953
Council document noted that it used
the term “clinical research” to imply research into the mechanisms and causation of disease,
including its prevention and cure. Thus, in the sense in which we use the term, it covers not simply
work on patients in hospital but also field studies in epidemiology and social medicine and obser-
vations in general practice. We wish it to be clearly understood that this interpretation applies
throughout the document [my emphasis].
The “essential reason” for such a push for clinical research was, the report con-
tinued, “that the growth of scientific knowledge has now progressed to the stage at
which clinical research can be developed, with confidence, on a scale commensurate
with the need”. Consequently the MRC, under the guidance of a newly created Clinical
Research Board, was to have the financial responsibility for research in the health
services. One further, and important, feature of this scheme was that provision be
made for a certain volume of research to be locally initiated.
21 The aim here was
clearly to involve local hospitals, universities, and various medical practitioners in
medical research.
As we shall see, this proved to be rather more problematic than it at first appeared.
None the less, in the early 1950s at least there was clearly an optimism about what scien-
tific research in medicine, broadly defined, could achieve and this parallels the optimism
about the changes brought about by the creation of the NHS. It is therefore appropriate
now to examine in more detail the opportunities afforded to the NHS and the MRC by
the post-war settlement.
18Report of the Medical Research Council for the
Year 1959–1960, Cmnd. 1422, London, HMSO,
1961, p. 131.
19Christopher Booth, ‘Clinical research’, in
Austoker and Bryder (eds), op. cit., note 9 above,
pp. 205–41, at p. 232ff; Valier and Timmermann,
‘Clinical trials and the reorganization of
medical research in post-Second World War
Britain’, below.
20Report of the Medical Research Council for the
Year 1951–1952, Cmd. 8876, London, HMSO, 1953,
pp. 3–4.
21Medical Research Council, Ministry of Health, and
the Department of Health for Scotland, Clinical research
in relation to the National Health Service, London,
HMSO,1953,pp.5,21.SeealsoValierandTimmermann,
‘Clinical trials and the reorganization of medical research
in post-Second World War Britain’, below.
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The era from around the mid-1940s to around the mid-1970s was, it is often argued,
the era of the “classic” welfare state founded on the Keynes–Beveridge paradigm; and,
as such, a period of both economic growth and welfare state creation, consolidation,
and expansion. The thirty years or so after the end of the Second World War contrasted
with the devastation of the war itself and the social misery and health inequalities of the
era which preceded it. Similarly, the “golden age” of post-war welfare capitalism can
also be contrasted with the socio-economic and political upheavals which started in the
1970s and resulted in, inter alia, a fundamental questioning of the premises of state-
sponsored social welfare throughout the western world. The age of “consensus”, during
which both major British political parties roughly agreed on the need for a welfare state
and a managed economy, ended, so the argument goes, as a result of both external
pressures and its own internal contradictions and inefficiencies.
If we look specifically at the NHS, it is clear that the fundamental principles on which it
was based—comprehensive health care free at the point of consumption for all citizens—
instituted a radically different way of financing and distributing health care.
22
Previously, access to health care had been determined by factors such as income, parti-
cipation in insurance schemes, age, gender, class, and geographical location. Unlike
post-war health care systems in other parts of western Europe, Britain’s was funded
not by social insurance but out of general taxation, of itself a form of social solidarity
wherein costs as well as benefits were universalized. While I shall have to qualify this
later, in broad terms the NHS and its founding principles remained largely unaltered at
least until the 1980s.
As might therefore be expected, since its creation the NHS has consumed a more or
less continuously rising proportion of the nation’s resources. This growth in health
expenditure, although again this will have to be qualified, was ahead of the rate of
growth of the economy as a whole.
23 Equally, we can see that the growth of NHS spend-
ing occurred irrespective of which political party was in power. Even though health
expenditure has been a highly problematic area, it can quite reasonably be pointed out
that one part of the service’s “success” was the huge amount of money which from the
very beginning had to be devoted to curing the accumulated ills of the British people.
This was not a negative characteristic of the service for its supporters—on the contrary.
The fact that not only did so many people need to be treated, but also that they indeed
were, showed that the system worked and the money was worth spending. Such an argu-
ment was put forward at the outset by the minister responsible for the creation of the
NHS, Aneurin Bevan, although he was not unreservedly against the possibility of impos-
ing charges in certain areas.
24
While clearly other factors were involved, in terms of health outcomes, the era of the
NHS has seen a steady improvement in the health of the British population. So, for
22For recent work on the history of health care
financing, see Martin Gorsky and Sally Sheard (eds),
Financing medicine: the British experience since
1750, London, Routledge, 2006.
23S e eRCOM a t t h e w s ,CHF e i n s t e i n ,a n dJC
Odling-Smee, British economic growth, 1856–1973,
Oxford, Clarendon, 1982, p. 25 Table 2.3, and passim.
24Webster, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 143ff.
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457instance, life expectancy at birth has risen steadily for both men and women and the
mortality rate for one especially vulnerable group, the very young, has declined
sharply.
25 Perhaps more intangibly, but importantly, none the less, for the British people
as a whole, the “fear” of falling sick has, at least from an economic point of view, been
removed. It is worth bearing in mind that Bevan’s political testament was entitled In
place of fear.
26 Bevan viewed the NHS itself as “pure socialism”, and the idea of remov-
ing “fear” in the provision of health care was especially appropriate given the circum-
stances under which it had previously been given and received. Equality of access,
irrespective of any constraining factor including income, had in other words been
guaranteed by the NHS settlement.
The post-1945 era also saw huge advances in medical knowledge, science, and technol-
ogy; and in attitudes to medical research. The MRC played an active and important part in
that respect. In a Commons debate in 1950 on the use of scientific resources, one MP
described the Council as a “particularly successful example of administration and
organisation”.
27 Two years later the MRC conducted research into what at first might
appear a rather esoteric area of social concern—the employment problems experienced
Table 1
Health expenditure, 1946–1976
1946 1951 1961 1971 1976
Health expenditure as % of GDP 1.72 3.46 3.28 4.02 4.91
Health expenditure, £ billion, at 1995/6 prices 3.5 8.6 10.9 17.5 23.7
DerivedfromTables2A.1and2A.2inHowardGlennerster,‘Newbeginningsandoldcontinuities’,in
Howard Glennerster and John Hills (eds), The state of welfare: the economics of social spending, 2nd
ed., Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 12–26, at pp. 25–6.
Table 2
NHS expenditure, percentage growth per annum by political complexion of government
1951–55 Cons 1955–59 Cons 1959–64 Cons 1964–70 Lab 1970–74 Cons 1974–79 Lab
1.1 2.1 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.3
DerivedfromFigure4.2inJudithAllsop,HealthpolicyandtheNHS:towards2000,2nded.,Harlow,
Longman, 1995, p. 69.
25Judith Allsop, Health policy and the NHS:
towards 2000, 2nd ed., Harlow, Longman, 1995,
pp. 120–1, Figure 6.1; Hardy, op. cit., note 9 above,
p. 180, Table 1.
26On In place of fear, see, for example, the essays
in Geoffrey Goodman (ed.), The state of the nation:
the political legacy of Aneurin Bevan, London, Victor
Gollancz, 1997.
27Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 474,
col. 2096, Group-Captain Wilcock, 1950.
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458by disabled youths in Glasgow. But, the Council report noted, there could be “few more
promising fields for the practice of constructive medicine”. Consequently, the report’s
recommendations embraced both the “overriding need to improve basic living condi-
tions” and “to harness all the resources of medicine for the prevention of disease”.
28
In a more obviously clinical field, meanwhile, the MRC consciously moved into the
area of cancer research. This had previously been the domain of the Imperial Cancer
Research Fund and the British Empire Cancer Campaign, and the MRC’s move, as
Timmermann has suggested, was part of its strategy to establish itself as “the main body
controlling clinical research in Britain”.
29
Reflecting on the MRC’s role in relation to “pure” medical science, Sir George Pick-
ering, Regius Professor of Medicine at the University of Oxford, addressed the dinner
celebrating the MRC’s fiftieth anniversary. The Council had, Pickering claimed, “with
great wisdom not restricted the quest for new knowledge to a narrow field”. As a
“spectacular and thrilling” example of this approach he cited the MRC-sponsored
research on the structure of proteins. This was, he exclaimed, “[A] far cry from practical
medicine! But then”, Pickering continued, “so are the new synthetic penicillins from the
culture fluid which grew the mould.” The Council had assumed the role of patron of
“novel and venturesome scientific research” and its own institution, the National Institute
for Medical Research, was “one of the most brilliant centres of medical research in the
world, and cradle of some of the most distinguished scientists”.
30
All this was underpinned by steadily rising financial support from government. MRC
income rose from just under half a million pounds in the immediate post-war period to,
as we have seen, around £25 million by the early 1970s. Even adjusted for inflation,
which was running at relatively low rates in the 1950s and 1960s, this was a significant
increase. Landsborough Thomson calculated that between the early 1950s and late 1960s
there was a cumulative annual growth rate of just under 10 per cent.
31 This too is
impressive, especially when placed against the rates of health expenditure and economic
growth discussed above. And, while the principal source of the MRC’s income was
direct government aid, it also received financial support from elsewhere. In 1965, for
instance, other government departments, and most notably the Ministry of Health, con-
tributed over half a million pounds. Further support came from charitable foundations,
usually for specific purposes or pieces of research. Large-scale donors included the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Wellcome Trust, each giving over £20,000 for travelling
fellowships.
32
There are, then, good reasons to take an optimistic view of Britain’s health services
and medical research in the era of the “classic” welfare state. There were also, however,
28T Ferguson, A N Macphail, and Margaret
I McVean, Employment problems of disabled youth in
Glasgow, Medical Research Council: Memorandum
28, London, HMSO, 1952, pp. 1, 65.
29Carsten Timmermann, ‘As depressing as it
was predictable? Lung cancer, clinical trials,
and the Medical Research Council in postwar
Britain’, Bull. Hist. Med., 2007, 81 (1): 312–34, at
p. 318.
30Sir George Pickering, ‘The future of the
Medical Research Council’, Br. med. J, 1963, ii:
1293–94, at p. 1293.
31Landsborough Thomson, Half a century of
medical research. Volume 1, op. cit., note 9 above,
p. 204.
32Report of the Medical Research Council,
October 1963–March 1965, Cmnd. 2787, London,
HMSO, 1965, pp. 280, 283.
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459constraints. I now examine these under three broad categories—expenditure, structure
and attitudes, and the wider context, before once again focusing briefly on the MRC
case study.
Constraints: Expenditure
To start, then, with the complex question of funding. Jim Tomlinson has argued that
what was created in Britain in the 1940s was an “austere” welfare state. To take one
measure of this, by the early 1950s in a league table of European public expenditure Brit-
ain occupied mid-position lagging behind, most notably, West Germany. More specifi-
cally on the NHS, Tomlinson has pointed out that no new hospitals were built until
the 1960s; and that health centres, which had been promised by the 1946 Act, barely
took off at all.
33 Indeed health centres provide a useful example of how certain aspects
of what had been envisaged of the NHS did not come to pass. The idea behind them
was that these small, community-based institutions would provide facilities for all
aspects of primary care. General practitioners would work alongside, and in co-operation
with, other health workers such as dentists, health visitors, and specialists in child med-
icine. This integrated approach would thus embrace not only curative medicine but also,
and crucially, preventive and social medicine. The “failure” of health centres was cer-
tainly due in part to material shortages in the immediate post-war period, but it was
also the result of the attitude of the medical profession, an issue to which I will return.
34
The apparently optimistic picture painted by the broad-brush Table 1 above, with its
secular upward trend of expenditure, also has to be qualified in other ways. For one
thing, even from such simple data it is clear, as Tomlinson has elaborated further, that
in proportionate terms health expenditure dipped after the early years of the NHS, not
recovering until the mid-1960s.
35 Moreover, as Webster has remarked of the 1950s:
The meagre resources normally available for expansion were for the most part swallowed up in
unavoidable expenditure beyond the control of NHS authorities, such as increases in pharmaceuti-
cal costs, in remuneration of doctors and dentists, and unanticipated emergencies.
36
To expand briefly on these points, Tomlinson has shown that in the hospital sector
capital expenditure actually fell as a proportion of total expenditure between the late
1930s and the early 1950s.
37 This, of course, accounts for the lack of hospital building
in the early years of the NHS, and for Webster’s point about salaries noted above. Phar-
maceuticals too proved problematic in that the increasing availability of new, effective,
and often expensive drugs had profound cost implications. As Tony Cutler has remarked,
during the planning stages of the NHS it was assumed that pharmaceutical expenditure
would be around 20 per cent that of general practitioners’ remuneration, but by the
33Jim Tomlinson, ‘Why so austere? The British
welfare state of the 1940s’, J. Soc. Policy, 1998,
27 (1): 63–77.
34For a brief commentary on the health centres
issue, see Charles Webster, ‘Conservatives and
consensus: the politics of the National Health Service,
1951–1964’, in Ann Oakley and A Susan Williams
(eds), The politics of the welfare state, London, UCL
Press, 1994, pp. 54–74, at p. 57.
35Jim Tomlinson, ‘Welfare and the economy: the
economic impact of the welfare state, 1945–1951’, 20
Century Br. Hist., 1995, 6 (2): 194–219, at p. 211.
36Webster, op. cit., note 34 above, p. 57.
37Tomlinson, op. cit., note 35 above, p. 204.
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38 The complex relationship between
the pharmaceutical industry, the MOH and the MRC, which was associated with this
rise in pharmaceutical expenditure, has been analysed by Viviane Quirke in relation to
corticosteroid drugs, which were developed in the 1950s and 1960s.
39
Indeed, even before the second post-war Labour government had left office, breaches
had been made in the principle of a free service as a result of concerns over apparently
spiralling costs. Prescription, ophthalmic, and dental charges were less important in
themselves at this stage—although they became the subject of endless political
bartering—but rather more so in signalling political and Treasury concern over the
apparently limitless expenditure a socialized health service might entail. One famous
indicator of such concerns was the appointment, by the Conservative government, of
the Guillebaud Committee, which reported in 1956. This, in fact, backfired on the
government in that the Committee demonstrated that the NHS was value for money
and, indeed, in need of large-scale capital expenditure.
40
But the setting up of the Guillebaud Committee was indicative of a deep-rooted poli-
tical and Treasury scepticism about social welfare expenditure. Tomlinson has suggested
that the creation of an “austere” welfare state in the 1940s was to have an “enduring
legacy in postwar Britain”, not least because of the ongoing influence of the Treasury
view.
41 Cutler has argued, in his analysis of the costings carried out during NHS
planning, that “early estimates of the likely cost of the NHS played a significant role
in providing a questionable standard by which parsimony was regularly justified in the
first decade of the Service”.
42 Often crude estimates were, in other words, taken as accu-
rate predictions and so gave those concerned with NHS costs an argument for expendi-
ture restraint. Reminding us that the NHS was born into a wider and troubled world,
Daniel Fox has noted that in the late 1940s the United States—at this point still supply-
ing Marshall Aid—put pressure on the British government to cut social welfare expendi-
ture and that at least some British civil servants and politicians agreed with the American
analysis.
43
Webster, as we have seen, has also been critical of the level of government commit-
ment to the NHS in the 1950s, further commenting that resources were denied in areas—
such as “medical advance”—where investment was needed to “keep up with rising
expectations and the pace of improvement experienced elsewhere in the Western
world”.
44 Paul Johnson likewise has remarked that although health expenditure did
indeed rise inexorably over the period with which we are concerned, none the less this
has “not been sufficient to meet rising demand caused by the ageing of the population,
the development of new and expensive medical interventions, and higher expectations
of treatment and service”.
45 We therefore again need to qualify our optimistic picture
38Tony Cutler, ‘Dangerous yardstick? Early cost
estimates and the politics of financial management in
the first decade of the National Health Service’, Med.
Hist., 2003, 47 (2): 217–38, at p. 231.
39Quirke, op. cit., note 8 above; idem, ‘Making
British cortisone: Glaxo and the development of
corticosteroid drugs in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s’,
Stud. Hist. Philos. Biolog. Biomed. Sci., 2005, 36: 645–74.
40Webster, op. cit., note 1 above, pp. 204–14.
41Tomlinson, op. cit., note 35 above, p. 75.
42Cutler, op. cit., note 38 above, p. 238.
43Daniel M Fox, ‘The administration of the
Marshall Plan and British health policy’, J. Policy
Hist., 2004, 16 (3): pp. 191–211.
44Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 35.
45Paul Johnson, ‘The welfare state, income and
living standards’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson
(eds), The Cambridge economic history of modern
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461of NHS expenditure in the post-war era to take account of changing demographic
patterns and scientific advance. It can thus be argued that increased expenditure was
barely keeping pace with changing circumstances.
Even so, it is undeniable that health expenditure did increase significantly in the
1960s. This was due to the Hospital Plan, but here too the picture is more complicated
than simply belated recognition of the need for more and more up-to-date hospital facil-
ities, and the provision of capital resources to this end.
46 For one thing, the Plan was con-
cerned as much with saving money through more efficient use of resources as with
expanding services. As such, it was a “failure”, characterized by spiralling costs and
its eventual replacement, in the early 1970s, by administrative reorganization as the
means of promoting economic efficiency. For present purposes, though, what was impor-
tant about the Hospital Plan was its underlying philosophy. This consisted of, essentially,
a technocratic approach which strongly favoured curative, and consequently also
hospital-based, medicine. In new, and very large, hospitals heroic surgery and newly
synthesized drugs were to be the solution to individual and national health problems.
This in turn reflected two key inter-related characteristics of the NHS: the service’s
administrative structures and the power of the medical profession, and it is to these
together, the second of our broad constraining factors, that I now turn.
Constraints: Structures and Attitudes
From at least the Edwardian era, reformers had argued for a unified health service. In
such a service all its components—primary care, hospital care, public health—would be
fully integrated and co-ordinated. Such an approach was often combined with a con-
sciously preventive or public health agenda, the idea being that a unified service, deeply
embedded in the local community, would be an important way of tackling the causes of
ill-health and thereby effecting what was seen as the necessary shift from curative to pre-
ventive medicine. However, the NHS as actually brought into being had a tripartite
structure: the hospital service; primary care; and, residually, various public health and
other duties left in the hands of the local authorities. This clumsy arrangement, which
plagued the NHS from its inception down to the 1970s and beyond, had among its draw-
backs that the three parts of the service did not necessarily, at local or regional level,
have the same geographical boundaries. This was hardly conducive to intra-service
co-ordination and integration. The reasons for this tripartite system are complex, but
for present purposes I will concentrate on the following.
47
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462First, Bevan, when formulating the NHS, was relatively uninterested in the administra-
tive details. He was therefore prepared to cede significant power in the running of the
service to the medical profession, both organizationally and in terms of strategic think-
ing. One area where Bevan was interested in administrative structures, however, was
in his hostility to any idea of local authorities being principally responsible for the run-
ning of the new service. The latter was thus, by previous standards of British social
administration and in contrast to most European systems, highly centralized.
Second, the medical profession undoubtedly gained a significant medico-political
victory in the 1940s through the ceding to it of strategic and administrative powers.
But much of the profession itself was at this stage at best indifferent, at worst actively
hostile, to preventive medicine, social medicine, and public health. A further reason
for the “failure” of health centres—institutions which, as we have seen, were actively
to address matters such as the promotion of health—was the lack of professional com-
mitment to them. As its critics rather cynically remarked in the 1930s and 1940s, the
medical profession had a “vested interest” in ill-health.
48
Third, and leading on from the two previous points, the administrative structures of the
NHS both allowed for and encouraged a situation wherein hospitals and hospital medi-
cine came to dominate health service strategy, just as the leaders of the medical profes-
sion desired. In fact this was to become a source of grievance to general practitioners
who felt their role was being diminished. From the point of view of this essay, what is
perhaps more important is that a service was created which favoured central rather
than local control; curative over preventive and social medicine and public health; and
hospitals over health centres and, indeed, primary care in general.
Moreover there was a further economic dimension to this in that the non-curative
aspects of the service were squeezed between the perceived need, led by the Treasury,
to keep costs down and the large sums involved in the technocratic approach as man-
ifested by, for example, the Hospital Plan. The location of many actually or potentially
preventive services in the local authority sector—a sector accorded low status—did lit-
tle to help. In short, the non-curative parts of the NHS have always been second best.
The career of social medicine, which started off with high hopes but soon narrowed
in focus and declined in influence, is illustrative of this broader history.
49 Against
this background it is salutary to note that the general improvement in health con-
ditions mentioned earlier notwithstanding, health inequalities persisted in British
society from the founding of the NHS to the 1970s and beyond. Such inequalities
continue, moreover, to be strongly related to social class and geography.
50 The
Resource Allocation Working Party, set up in 1975, was a somewhat belated attempt
to address this issue.
51
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463Constraints: The Wider Context
Our third broad constraint on the NHS in the quarter century after its creation concerns
the wider context in which it operated. Despite its popularity, judging the service’s status
and performance is problematic. To return to international comparisons, it is noticeable
that in the era of the “classic” welfare state Britain’s expenditure on welfare was over-
taken not only by West Germany but also by France, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, and the
Netherlands in the 1950s; and in the early 1970s by Norway and Finland. Focusing on
health, if we take the early 1990s and compare Britain with other OECD countries,
then roughly speaking the picture which emerges is that the British health care system
is neither extravagant nor parsimonious. Similarly, while for the most part a state-
provided service, Britain once again is not at the extreme statist end of this spectrum.
In terms of outcomes, here too the British experience is not dissimilar to that of other
western European nations, for example in terms of life expectancy.
52 At least on these
rather crude criteria, therefore, it is difficult to make a case for NHS exceptionalism or
for a service which is in the vanguard of health promotion.
On the domestic front, it might be assumed that the government department responsi-
ble for the central institution of the welfare state, the Ministry of Health, would be at the
forefront of British politics. In fact, this was not always the case. For significant parts of
our period, the Minister of Health was not a member of the Cabinet, and indeed in the
1950s in particular the post was subject to rapid turnover and on occasions filled by indi-
viduals not of the most inspiring or dynamic type.
53 Although this situation improved in
the late 1960s, it was also complicated by the absorption of the health ministry into the
huge Department of Health and Social Security, an arrangement which persisted until
the late 1980s. In a revealing insight into the attitude of both the medical profession
and the problems of running such an organization Richard Crossman recorded that:
When an administrator has a job to do for the Secretary of State, he puts everything else aside and
does it as the first priority. But not a doctor. They feel totally aloof and I increasingly find that their
part of the [merged] Department runs on its own and doesn’t like even to feel that it is being
ordered about by the Secretary of State.
54
Lacking a place in Cabinet was not merely a status issue, nor are we simply compar-
ing the charismatic Bevan with some of his less colourful successors. Absence from the
Cabinet meant that the Minister of Health had a much more difficult task in negotiating
with the ever parsimonious Treasury for funds. It is notable that one of the few ministers
of health to make any significant impact in the 1950s and early 1960s was Enoch Powell,
the author of the Hospital Plan. Powell had the support of the Treasury precisely because
of his proto-monetarist views, and his time at the Ministry is remembered as much for
his determination to cut expenditure as for the undoubtedly innovative, if ultimately
flawed, Hospital Plan. Generally speaking, though, ministers of health had a tough
52Jose ´ Harris, ‘Enterprise and welfare states: a
comparative perspective’, Trans. R. Hist. Soc., Fifth
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464time financially. This situation was exacerbated in that the Ministry’s perceived status
led in turn to its recruiting poorer quality civil servants. It was thus something of a civil
service backwater and this is borne out by comparison with the legally and administra-
tively separate Scottish health service. Scotland’s NHS chief was the Secretary of State
for Scotland, who sat in the Cabinet; and the relevant Department of the Scottish Office
recruited civil servants of a markedly higher calibre than those of the Ministry of Health.
Whether by accident or design this resulted in a more integrated and co-ordinated service
which also managed to extract more expenditure per capita from the Treasury.
55
Furthermore, and notions of post-war “consensus” notwithstanding, the creation and
development of the NHS was a highly contested process.
56 So, for example, the Conser-
vative government, in private at least, did little to hide its annoyance at the Guillebaud
Report.
57 Even before Guillebaud, two future Conservative health ministers were raising
concerns about the provision of a “free” health service on a non-contributory basis and
about the validity of Beveridge’s “assumption” of the need for such a service in his
wartime report on social insurance.
58 Nor were differences over health policy simply
between the political parties. In 1968 Richard Crossman recorded an acrimonious meet-
ing of the Parliamentary Labour Party over the issue of prescription charges. This was,
he remarked, “the worst we have ever had”. What was taking place was “a demonstration
of conscience after the conscience had already been raped”.
59 The history of the National
Health Service is thus both shaped by, and contributor to, broader socio-economic
and political circumstances. As commentators have variously pointed out, the NHS has
since its inception appeared to exist in an almost permanent state of “crisis”, real or ima-
gined.
60 This can be seen as a reflection of the insecurities of post-war Britain, even
during the “golden age” of the welfare state.
Constraints on the MRC
The MRC too was subject to constraints, as part of the broader political and socio-
economic landscape. In the mid-1950s one of its major projects was clinical trials of
influenza vaccine. To carry out this research, the voluntary co-operation of various indi-
viduals and bodies was required. On one level, this was a success. As a letter from the
Public Health Laboratory Service noted in 1955, the unprecedentedly widescale “co-
operative effort” involved had “given us the most valuable results ...and has ...added
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465to our knowledge of the epidemiology of influenza”.
61 But the co-operating bodies, like
the MRC itself, were bound by the economic circumstances of the times. Professor
Alexander Macdonald of the University of Aberdeen, for instance, wrote that his depart-
ment was happy to participate in the MRC trials. However his university’s “dire financial
straits” made it difficult to purchase even the most basic materials, in this particular case
fertile eggs.
62
Relating more directly to the Council itself, in 1961 a question on its future was put to
the Commons by Laurie Pavitt MP. Pavitt, at this point Chair of Labour’s Health Group
and later a member of the MRC, asked what the prospects were for improving medical
research. In a positive response, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Science
pointed out that expenditure on the Council had trebled over the preceding ten years.
Pavitt found this “totally unsatisfactory”. Was the Parliamentary Secretary aware, he
continued, “that the United States are now spending about 4,000 million dollars on
research? Is he aware that this is costing the country quite a lot in its bills for imported
pharmaceutical products?” The former replied that medical research was in fact carried
out by a range of bodies, to which Pavitt further suggested that the government “arrange
for some planning and co-ordination instead of having this ramshackle arrangement for
research”.
63
This was a revealing exchange on a number of levels. The concern over pharmaceuti-
cals, for example, further attests to the rapid post-war expansion in this field and the
associated demands on the NHS.
64 Others picked up similar points. Landsborough
Thomson claimed that in the mid-1960s the US government’s medical and health
research expenditure was around five times that of its British counterpart on a per capita
basis.
65 He, like Pavitt, also pointed to the dispersed and relatively unco-ordinated nature
of medical research, with the MRC, the universities, the hospitals, charitable founda-
tions, and private industry all pursuing their own agenda.
66 On the issue of universities,
and displaying the MRC’s limitations in terms of directing and co-ordinating research,
the Council told the Royal Commission on Medical Education that arrangements for
research to be taken over by universities were “dependent entirely on the willingness
of the university to accept continuing responsibility for it: there was no question of foist-
ing research on unwilling universities”.
67
Pickering, in his 1963 speech, likewise compared British medical research expenditure
unfavourably with that in America, one consequence of which was the “loss of scientists
abroad”.
68 He was thus adding to broader fears about the “brain drain” which, so the
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466argument went, was contributing to relative economic decline. The supply of scientific
labour was not, however, a new issue. A Treasury official reported in 1954 that it was
the MRC’s view that “the real bottleneck in medical research is the number of people
of really good quality whom they can get”. Putting a typical Treasury spin on this
view, the official thus further remarked that the “limitation is brains rather than
money”.
69
In his “official” history Landsborough Thomson, in a carefully constructed passage,
agreed that it was “broadly true” that skilled scientists rather than financial resources
had been the “major limiting factor” in the MRC’s development. None the less, he
attacked as “naı ¨ve” the idea that funds should be “allocated on the basis of the relative
importance of various diseases”. Leading directly on from this, he remarked that funding
had “never been lavish in relation to demand” and that there had thus been a constant
need for “economy in expenditure”. Such financial stringency was, of course, in general
terms necessary but could also have a “retarding effect”. The Council was therefore put
in the (implicitly impossible) position of having to balance existing projects with new
ones. Consequently,
... however substantial the Council’s funds have been in recent times, there remains a constant
difficulty in preserving a sufficient margin for exploiting the new opportunities that arise in unfore-
seen ways and often with heavy financial implications; yet it is developments of this kind that
merit special priority.
70
To put a complicated argument crudely, by its very nature scientific investigation was
unpredictable and could follow both fruitful and unfruitful paths. But until those paths
were followed, nobody could be sure what lay at their ends. Investment in scientific
research should not, therefore, be so inflexible that it unreasonably curtailed such jour-
neys, present or future. In certain respects, this is strikingly parallel to the argument
for preventive medicine—invest now for long-term rather than immediate gains.
The MRC was again discussed in Parliament in the early 1970s. The issue this time
was the deliberations of the Rothschild Committee, which had been asked to look at var-
ious aspects of the machinery of government. Labour MPs were clearly concerned about
proposals which, as they saw it, would hamper the MRC’s object of “pursuing an inde-
pendent policy for the advancement of knowledge towards the relief of human
suffering”. One way in which this might happen was through the introduction of “the
customer-contractor principle in relation to applied medical research”—an unwitting
anticipation of what was to be a central aspect of health service policy in the 1980s
and 1990s. Margaret Thatcher, responding in her capacity as Secretary of State for
Education and Science, articulated the government’s position that “the customer/
contractor principle should be implemented in respect of applied research and develop-
ment carried out or sponsored by the Government whether by the research councils or
elsewhere”.
71
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467Finally, in this section I turn to the report of a Joint Working Party, under the chair-
manship of Sir Douglas Black, produced at the time of health service re-organization
in the mid-1970s. This re-visited the issue of clinical research and the proposal that
where appropriate this be devolved to regional and local bodies. We saw earlier that
this was the aim of the 1953 MRC report which had also adopted a very broad definition
of what constituted “clinical research”. The Joint Working Party noted that the recom-
mendations of the 1953 report for decentralized clinical research had been put in place
in 1958/59. At this point, only a handful of regional bodies had availed themselves of
the opportunity to gain funds from the MRC and in consequence there was an under-
spend on even the modest financial estimate. Although by the early 1970s take up was
much greater, with £1.2 million being expended, none the less when shared among the
various regional bodies each gained a relatively small amount. The Working Party
made a virtue of this, noting that “the scheme was intended for relatively modest
short-term work, major research programmes being reserved for the central organi-
sation”. More problematically in the early years, despite the original emphasis on “the
importance of field studies and observations amongst the general population”, resources
had been used “entirely to the support of research in hospitals”. The Chief Medical Offi-
cer had sought to address this through a series of initiatives in the mid-1960s, but “most
Boards still continued to spend the great majority of funds allocated ... in support of
hospital projects”. As in the health service more generally, then, the primary focus
appears to have been on hospitals. The Joint Working Party not only recommended,
therefore, that more funds be allocated to the scheme, but also reaffirmed that “the
scheme is designed to support a wide range of research in the community as well as
in hospital”. It should thus be re-named “and be publicised widely amongst the health
professionals in all parts of the service”.
72
What is of concern for present purposes is not the detail of these cases but rather the
more general point that the MRC, just like the NHS, operated in changing historical
circumstances and that political and socio-economic concerns impacted on this
“independent” body just as much as on any other. Nor, as we have seen, was medical
research unified. Besides the MRC, other interested parties, with their own agenda,
included the universities and private companies. The former also, of course, had to
deal with other health-related agencies and departments. All this is brought out clearly
in Webster’s much-cited article on the NHS and tobacco smoking. Early in the post-
war period the MRC had played an important role in supporting research into smoking
and health, and promoting its findings. However, partly because of the vested interests
in tobacco consumption; partly because of political fears about revenue loss should
smoking be curtailed; partly because of disputes about the reliability of the evidence;
and partly because of the complex and fragmented structures of the NHS, the “scientific”
findings supported by the MRC took a long time to translate into policy. As Webster
has remarked of the fourth of these points, a “powerful and complex advisory
machinery stood between MRC and the NHS” which did little to “facilitate swift action
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468on an important issue”.
73 Virginia Berridge likewise has drawn attention to the problems
of implementing policy hostile to smoking, and indeed the somewhat ambiguous




Rodney Lowe has observed that the “establishment of the NHS in 1948 ...provided
an opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of collective action and public initiative.
This opportunity was not fully seized.” Lowe has attributed this “failure” in part to the
attitudes of the medical profession and to the service’s structures.
75 We have seen how
these did indeed inhibit the development of a fully socialized service which took as its
model of health not simply the absence of sickness but also the active promotion of phy-
sical and mental well-being. Lowe’s judgement is therefore harsh, but fair, particularly
when we also take into account the relationship between health expenditure and factors
such as changing population structure. In our case study of the MRC, meanwhile, we
have seen that concerns were variously expressed about the level of resources allocated
to it and its place in the complex bureaucratic structures of the modern state. The
Council’s ambitions for a broadly-based form of medical research, embracing the clinical
and the social, have to be seen against this background of constraints and change. Further
research is clearly necessary on the Council’s post-war history, but the interpretation pre-
sented here suggests both the organization’s positive achievements and its need to oper-
ate in an environment which on occasion inhibited its aspirations.
Of course it can quite legitimately be argued that the demand for health care, and for
support for scientific research, is essentially incapable of ever being satisfied. And it is
clear that while the early NHS did at least acknowledge the need for a preventive pro-
gramme, it was taken aback by the demands on its curative services which the advent
of “free” health care engendered. However, pursuing a social/preventive/public health
agenda would have required a much more radical approach than that adopted in the
post-war era. Attacking health inequalities would, by the same token, have downgraded
the role of biomedicine in favour of more obviously environmental approaches, although
of course the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. What is also problematic, and
this is a dilemma of long-term planning in a democratic society, is that addressing health
issues from a preventive standpoint involves not only political will, but also a recogni-
tion that its benefits may take a considerable time to come to fruition. To put it another
way, it is politically more attractive to increase short-term hospital capacity than to insti-
tute a preventive programme via, say, health centres.
It can, however, equally be argued that some of the interest groups and organizations
discussed in this volume stood to benefit from the sort of situation described in this
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469essay. For them, hospital-based medicine, a broadly curative philosophy, and a “mixed
economy of research” could clearly offer significant opportunities. All this suggests is
that, when discussing the sort of processes and organizations dealt with in the other
essays in this volume, we need to be conscious of the political economy of socialized
health care and the differing aims and aspirations of the various parties involved in the
provision of health care and medical research since the Second World War.
John Stewart
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